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Abstract 
 
When an intense public controversy erupted around agricultural biotechnology in the late 1990s, 
critics found more opportunities to challenge risk-assessment criteria and test methods for GM 
products. In relation to GM food, they criticised the concept of “substantial equivalence”, which 
EU and US regulators had adopted as the basis for a harmonised “science-based” approach to 
risk assessment.  Scientific uncertainty was framed in different ways by competing policy 
agendas. “Substantial equivalence” was contested and was eventually recast to accommodate 
some criticisms. To explain how the concept changed, this paper links two analytical 
perspectives. “Regulatory science” perspectives illuminate how the “scientification of politics” 
and “politicisation of science” led to shifts in the boundary between science and policy. 
“Governance” perspectives illuminate how the “collective problem” for policy was redefined to 
provide a new common ground for some stakeholders. Overall “substantial equivalence” was 
recast to govern the social conflict and address legitimacy problems of regulatory procedures. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s agricultural biotechnology became a legitimacy crisis for government decision 
making. In the European Union (EU) public protest led to delays in approving GM products, 
blockages of US maize exports, and a commercial boycott of GM grain. These developments in 
turn created more opportunities for critics to challenge safety claims. In particular they criticised 
the concept of “substantial equivalence”, which governments were using to assess the safety of 
GM food. Variously called a concept, a principle, a risk-assessment tool or all three at once, 
substantial equivalence has played an ambiguous and controversial role. This paper examines 
how “substantial equivalence” was contested and recast. 
 
Material cited in this paper comes from three research projects (see Acknowledgements).  In 
both projects, analysis of policy and regulatory documents informed research questions for 
semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted with policy actors at the interface 
between constituencies in conflict over the issues. This allowed research to focus on changing 
relationships and strategies. The paper includes some interview quotes taken from transcripts or 
from notes checked by the interviewee. More generally the interviews informed our analysis and 
our selection of documentary evidence. 
 
The empirical sections of this paper are structured in a largely chronological way. They outline 
how “substantial equivalence” was agreed, implemented, challenged, recast and then re-
interpreted, especially in EU practice (see Table I). This happened through overlapping 
discussions in diverse institutional settings over time. To analyse how they recast the concept, 
the story draws on two analytical perspectives discussed at the outset – “regulatory science” and 
“governance”. Through the story we answer three questions about substantial equivalence: What 
agendas initially shaped the concept? How has its meaning changed over time? How can these 
changes be explained? More broadly we ask how different policy agendas framed scientific 
uncertainty about GM food safety. 
 
[Insert Table I here.] 
 
2. Analytical Perspectives: Regulatory Science and Global Governance 
 
This section outlines the analytical perspectives that we use later. Drawing on social studies of 
science literature, we discuss “regulatory science”, which helps us to analyse conflicts around 
risk assessment criteria. From political science we discuss “governance”, which helps us to 
analyse stakeholder interactions and competing policy agendas. By linking these perspectives 
we analyse how “substantial equivalence” was recast as a means to govern social conflicts 
around GM food. 
 
2.1 Regulatory Science 
 
In the 1970s, when governments depended increasingly on technical expertise to guide or justify 
regulatory decisions, this dependence was seen as potentially exercising a technocratic control 
over policy.  However, various technological and risk controversies complicated that scenario.  
In these controversies, protest was aimed “less against specific technological decisions than 
against the declining capacity of citizens to shape policies that affect their interests; less against 
science than against the use of scientific rationality to mask political choices” (Nelkin: 1979: 
11).  Opposition groups developed and used their own experts with various aims, such as “to 
prove that technical data are at best uncertain and subject to different interpretations”. 
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Conflicting technical interpretations generated political activity and demands for a greater role 
for the public in decision making (ibid: 15-17).   
 
Technological and risk controversies feature various languages of risk, which can be analysed as 
contending issue-frames.  When different groups describe risks, “Some talk of cost-effective 
solutions, of efficiency; others use the language of ‘rights’, emphasising moral issues and 
questions of social responsibility, justice and obligation.”  If risks are defined in terms of 
insufficient technical evidence, for example, then this implies that risk assessment is the 
appropriate approach to regulation. “In some cases, increased knowledge may eventually 
depoliticise an issue …” (Nelkin, 1982: 18-21). 
 
Efforts to depoliticise risk through technical evidence can be understood as scientising politics.  
Scientisation “implies that political and social issues are better resolved through technical 
expertise than democratic deliberation” (Bäckstrand, 2004: 24).  However, each group interprets 
scientific uncertainty and appeals to criteria for evidence in ways favourable to their respective 
policy stances, so it is difficult to reconcile such conflicts through science alone  (e.g. 
Bedsworth et al., 2004).  Moreover, various scientific disciplines and cognitive approaches 
generate conflicting evidence (Beck, 1992: 167).  Thus efforts to scientise politics can be 
undermined by expert disputes. 
 
Beyond the scientisation of politics, Peter Weingart (1999: 154). has theorised the 
“scientification of politics”. In this process, expertise plays two related roles: (1) it acts 
instrumentally by clarifying scientific problems through more reliable knowledge; (2) it 
legitimises decisions by absorbing scientific uncertainty into expert advice and thus supporting 
policy decisions. As distinct from scientisation, however, scientification means that regulatory 
authorities become more dependent upon scientific progress e.g. new methods and knowledge.  
This dependence can lead to an abundance of knowledge, open to diverse interpretations. 
Science can raise new issues for which further expertise is needed.  
 
Ultimately the scientification of politics can result in the politicisation of science, with a 
competition for the latest scientific evidence which supports or undermines a specific policy. 
This competition “drives the recruitment of expertise far beyond the realm of consensual 
knowledge, right up to the research frontier where knowledge claims are uncertain, contested 
and open to challenge” (ibid: 158). The inflationary use of expertise can intensify controversies, 
open up policy to non-expert views, and de-legitimise science as a basis for decisions, 
particularly when experts disagree in public (Weingart, 1999). 
 
We can explore these issues further by examining the flexible, contested boundary between 
science and policy. In practice regulatory experts are not engaged in ‘science’ in the ordinary 
sense, but rather “a hybrid activity that combines elements of scientific evidence and reasoning 
with large doses of social and political judgement” (Jasanoff, 1990: 229). When scientists give 
advice on regulatory decisions, the cognitive authority of science may be jeopardised. This 
difficulty arises partly because the available scientific knowledge may not provide authoritative 
answers to policy questions. In such situations it becomes more difficult to justify any particular 
version of ‘science’ as policy-free (Jasanoff, 1987). 
 
The science/policy boundary also matters for institutional power in regulatory decision-making. 
Broader accounts of “science” increase the scope for expert advice to influence or constrain 
regulatory decisions. When the US Environmental Protection Agency was regulating toxic 
chemicals in the 1980s, for example, expert advice was generally more favourable than 
regulators to safety claims, so industry defined the scope of ‘science’ more broadly to enhance 
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the authority of expert advisory bodies (Jasanoff, 1987). Defining narrowly or broadly the scope 
of ‘scientific’ questions is therefore central to setting or contesting a boundary between science 
and policy. 
 
2.2 Global Governance 
 
Global rules are often designed to promote regulatory harmonisation and trade liberalisation. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, tries to 
harmonise data requirements for the risk regulation of products to enhance regulatory efficiency 
and avoid trade barriers. However, such rules “effectively narrow the menu of regulatory 
choices open to governments” (Newell, 2003: 61, 64). More generally, and less tangibly, 
constraints are imposed on governments through “a discourse of technical-rational knowledge” 
which represents all problems as amenable to technocratic solutions and control (Ford, 2003: 
124-25). These tendencies are illustrated by the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
 
Over the past decade or so, such developments created the context from which the term 
“governance” emerged as a policy concept. As some political scientists have argued, “economic 
globalisation and political change have created a crisis of the old hegemonic structures and 
forms of political consent, which are now coming apart…” (Lipschutz, 1996: 55; citing Gill, 
1993: 32-33). This provided an opportunity for new transnational networks to form and protest. 
Protest in turn has led governments and international bodies to develop more consultative or 
participatory forms of decision-making. The outcome can be “alliances between coalitions in 
global civil society and the international governance arrangements associated with the UN 
system” (Lipschutz, 1997: 96). Global governance, therefore, “can be seen as a product of two 
phenomena: the pursuit of neoliberal forms of globalisation, and the resistance to such 
centralisation of power” (Paterson et al., 2003: 2).  
 
How are such deep conflicts governed? In the political science literature, governance is often 
understood as co-operation to deal with collective problems and related conflicts. For example: 
… governance involves the establishment and operation of social institutions in the sense of 
rules of the game… capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, 
alleviating collective-action problems in a world of interdependent actors. (Young, 1994: 15) 
Along similar lines, governance has been described as “a continuing process through which 
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken” 
(CGG, 1995: 2). 
 
Some governance theorists and policy makers take for granted the “collective problem”. By 
contrast, critical perspectives analyse how problems are (re)defined as collective ones in order to 
manage conflict.  According to Dominique Pestre, global governance has “aimed at establishing 
common values for the management of a collective, and ultimately reconciled, future”.  
Consequently, “The only remaining questions are procedural and managerial in nature”. 
As Moreau Défarges [2001] and others have suggested, the vocabulary of governance conveys the 
idea that the world of politics, as it was invented and has been practiced for more than two centuries, 
is de facto obsolete. Not only because it is based on an overly conflictual understanding of the social, 
but also because it relies too much on the State and the formal procedures of representative 
democracy….  (Pestre, 2007). 
 
In this strategic sense of governance, fundamental conflict can be displaced into supposedly 
collective problems and their managerial-procedural solutions.  Drawing on such critical 
perspectives, this paper analyses how expert procedures defined new policy problems as 
collective ones, as a basis for governing the legitimacy crisis over agricultural biotechnology. 
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3. Implementing “Substantial Equivalence” 
 
In the 1990s questions were raised about genetic modification potentially generating unknown 
risks and about how these could be identified for each product.  This section shows how a 
network of policy actors devised and implemented the concept of “substantial equivalence” as a 
means to address those uncertainties (see Table I.1).  The concept linked science with policy in a 
way which initially scientised politics. This approach complemented the regulatory 
harmonisation agendas of the US and the EU. 
 
3.1 OECD Guidelines: “Substantial Equivalence” 
 
Intergovernmental organisations began to discuss GM products in the 1980s. From the mid-
1980s the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sought risk-
assessment methods that would help to liberalise trade in biotechnology products.  An early 
report linked regulatory harmonisation with the aim “to facilitate data exchange and minimise 
trade barriers between countries” (OECD, 1986: 42).   
 
Specifically for GM food products, an expert contribution came from a meeting organised by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), 
which jointly host the Codex Alimentarius Commission.   According to their expert consultation 
report, “safety assessment should be based on sound scientific principles and data” (FAO/WHO, 
1991: 23). The report agreed that GM foods could be compared with conventional counterparts 
as part of a safety assessment, but it also drew attention to the lack of baseline information: 
Comparative data on the closest conventional counterpart are critically important in the 
evaluation of a new food, including data on chemical composition and nutritional value. The 
Consultation believed that such data are not widely available at the present time. (ibid: 24). 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also hosted discussions 
on the safety of GM food.  Nominated by 19 member governments, the participants were 
regulatory scientists from government agencies and ministries responsible for food safety.   The 
main outcome was a document proposing methods and principles for Safety Evaluation of Foods 
Derived by Modern Biotechnology.  According to this document, GM food “does not necessitate 
a fundamental change in established principles, nor does it require a different standard of 
safety”; moreover, the precise techniques involved in genetic modification “should enable direct 
and focused assessment of safety where such assessment is desired” (OECD, 1993: 10). It also 
promoted the concept of substantial equivalence: 
The main conclusion of this report is as follows: if a new food or food component is found to be 
substantially equivalent to an existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same 
manner with respect to safety. No additional safety concerns would be expected. Where 
substantial equivalence is more difficult to establish because the food or food component is 
either less well-known or totally new, then the identified differences, or the new characteristics, 
should be the focus of further safety considerations. (OECD, 1993: 13) 
 
Thus the 1993 OECD report ignored the 1991 FAO/WHO caveat regarding the lack of 
comparative data.  On this basis, the OECD report also implied that substantial equivalence 
might be used to demonstrate similarity and therefore safety, mainly through tests of physico-
chemical composition.  Such tests could be implemented and accepted across countries, thus 
facilitating the transatlantic policy agenda of regulatory harmonisation and trade liberalisation. 
The concept of substantial equivalence gained support by linking science and policy in this 
particular way, through an intergovernmental process which did not involve NGOs. 
 
 6
3.2 US Practice: “Substantially Similar” Products 
 
In the 1980s the US government identified biotechnology as essential for the future of US 
agriculture and its international competitiveness.   A key policy document argued that the 
products of recombinant DNA technology would not differ fundamentally from unmodified 
organisms or from conventional products (OSTP, 1986). On this basis it was decided that no 
new legislation was necessary for regulating GM products. Building on this policy, the US Food 
and Drug Administration published a guidance document on risk assessment of foods derived 
from new plant varieties, including GM crops (US FDA, 1992).  
 
According to the 1992 guidance, the FDA expected genetic modification of plants to produce 
components “substantially similar” to those commonly found in food, e.g. those Generally 
Recognised as Safe (GRAS). Similarity could be demonstrated by testing chemical composition. 
In cases where such methods could not resolve safety concerns, “feeding studies or other 
toxicological tests may be warranted”. However, “feeding studies on whole foods have limited 
sensitivity because of the inability to administer exaggerated doses”. According to the FDA, its 
guidelines were “consistent with the concept of substantial equivalence” being discussed by 
OECD experts at that time (US FDA, 1992: 24, 17; see above). 
 
In this way, chemical composition became a central criterion for GM food safety assessment in 
the US.  This emphasis can be explained partly by the methodological problems of testing the 
toxicity of whole foods or complex mixtures. In retrospect an FDA official stated: 
Such animal feeding studies are difficult to design and interpret. For example, the experimental 
conditions can perturb the nutritional quality of the diet, relative to the control. And it can be 
difficult to feed large quantities of a specific protein or of a complex substance such as a whole 
food… (interview, FDA, 04.08.03) 
 
In addition, however, US government policy was promoting agricultural biotechnology as an 
economic necessity and as a source of predictably safe products.  According to the President's 
Council on Competitiveness, the government must maintain “risk-based regulation” and thus 
“avoid excessive restrictions that curtail the benefits of biotechnology to society” (BWG/CoC, 
1991: viii, 11). In this context the FDA guidelines facilitated safety claims by emphasising 
compositional tests. 
 
On that basis the US government has not required companies to obtain pre-market approval of 
GM foods. In practice, companies have sought FDA review; they have submitted data on 
physical composition of GM foods, as grounds for why no risk assessment is required. Some 
submissions have also cited data on toxicological tests on the novel protein. In response the 
FDA has sent each company a lettering noting the safety claim and stating: “it is our 
understanding that [the developer] has concluded that [the food product] does not raise issues 
that would require pre-market review or approval of FDA”. In this way the FDA has taken no 
responsibility for any judgements on data or safety. In the mid-1990s NGOs unsuccessfully 
proposed that the FDA should classify GM foods as food additives, as a basis to require that risk 
assessments be done (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996: 106-07). 
 
3.3 EU Practice: simplified procedure 
 
In contrast to the US, EU policymakers took the view that GM products do raise new 
uncertainties about risk and so warranted special legislation. Directive 90/220, on the deliberate 
release of GMOs into the environment, aimed to prevent “adverse effects on human health or 
the environment”. It established a legal duty on producers to seek prior approval before release 
of any GMO in the European Union.  Producers had to submit a dossier giving information that 
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could be used to evaluate any risks (EEC, 1990).  The Deliberate Release Directive served 
briefly as the EU’s regulatory framework for assessing GM food safety. 
 
In 1997 the EU revised its legislation, giving “substantial equivalence” a statutory role. 
Regulation 258/97 on Novel Food established a legal duty to seek approval before 
commercialisation of any novel food, e.g. GM food. Unlike Directive 90/220, however, this new 
law had a simplified procedure for novel foods “substantially equivalent to existing foods or 
food ingredients as regards their composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended use and 
the level of undesirable substances contained therein”; the regulation gave no more detail. If a 
GM product was substantially equivalent to a conventional counterpart, then no risk assessment 
was required (EC, 1997a: 3). In the late 1990s several GM foods were approved in this way. 
 
This procedure helped to harmonise product approval across the Atlantic, in line with the 
OECD’s intentions for the concept of substantial equivalence. The EU procedure was also 
consistent with the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), an EU-US inter-governmental 
initiative focused on liberalising trade in various sectors. Trade liberalisation could be achieved 
through mutual acceptance of safety judgements; this would be easier if EU and US legislation 
was underpinned by similar concepts. In 1998 EU and US officials working through the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership, an NTA implementation mechanism, were proposing a 
project on simultaneous assessment of a GM product in both jurisdictions, as a further step 
towards regulatory harmonisation (Murphy and Levidow, 2006). 
 
4. Challenging “Substantial Equivalence” 
 
When GM food became more controversial in the late 1990s, so did the meaning of substantial 
equivalence.  Particularly in the EU, regulatory policy became increasingly dependent upon 
knowledge that was near the research frontier, thus leaving risk assessment vulnerable to 
criticism.  This section describes the scientification of policy, which ultimately went hand-in-
hand with the politicisation of science.  Policy actors selectively cited empirical results and 
expert claims favourable to their policy agenda (see Table I.2). This section also illustrates how 
scientific uncertainties were framed differently by competing policy agendas.  
 
4.1 Early Challenge and Protest 
 
An early challenge to substantial equivalence came from Consumers International (CI). They 
emphasised uncertainties associated with genetic novelty and the limitations of laboratory tests: 
… consumer experts are concerned that this concept has only limited value. First of all, it is very 
difficult to assess substantial equivalence… Too much importance is attached to digestibility 
tests for assessing safety. Finally, there is a lack of available scientific data on safety of 
traditional foodstuffs used for comparison with GEFs [genetically engineered foods (CI, 1996: 
1)…  In a field of science in which many of the mechanisms are still a mystery, great caution is 
needed (ibid: 3). 
 
Their report recommended that GM food safety assessment should involve a wide range of 
additional tests, as a means to address scientific unknowns and methodological weaknesses 
(ibid: 4-11; see later citations). 
 
NGOs hostile to agricultural biotechnology attacked substantial equivalence in stronger terms. 
For example, some criticised Monsanto for evaluating glyphosate-tolerant soybeans without 
testing how glyphosate sprays might affect their composition (Tappeser and von Weizsacker, 
1996). According to such critics, substantial equivalence is “unscientific and arbitrary…. 
intentionally vague and ill-defined to be as flexible, malleable and open to interpretation as 
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possible”. Furthermore, “Genetic engineering carries its own inherent hazards which are unique 
to it”, e.g. a general hazard from lab techniques which incorporate viral DNA into the new 
organism (Ho and Steinbrecher, 1997: 8, 6). In this way doubt was cast on the capacity of 
science to reduce and clarify biotechnological risks through more knowledge. 
 
Some environmental NGOs, especially in Europe, opposed agricultural biotechnology 
altogether. They explicitly linked GM food with past food crises. Drawing an analogy to the 
scandal over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as ‘mad cow’ disease, 
Greenpeace referred to “untestable” risks of GM food (Greenpeace, 1997a: 5, 11). In a direct 
attack on substantial equivalence, they stated: “Sheep offal contained the scrapie prion but 
would not have been picked up by the conventional chemical analysis or short-term testing 
required to determine ‘substantial equivalence’” (Greenpeace, 1997b: 27). By using metaphors 
like “genetic contamination”, such opponents characterised all GMOs as pollutants. GM crops 
were cast as further industrialising agriculture, driven by commercial forces; agbiotech 
symbolised an ominous form of globalisation that was undermining safety regulation and 
democracy. 
 
In the late 1990s European consumer activism gained political importance for many reasons: the 
1996-97 mad cow crisis, other food scandals, challenges to expert safety claims, food boycotts, 
and anti-biotech movements stimulating opposition among the public.  The director of the UK 
Consumers Association criticised the agro-food industry for its “unshakeable belief in whizz-
bang techniques to conjure up the impossible – food that is safe and nutritious but also cheap 
enough to beat the global competition” (McKechnie, 1999).    In these ways arguments that 
linked agricultural biotechnology with efficiency were turned upside-down to raise doubts about 
safety. Consumer NGOs demanded more rigorous risk assessment as well as segregation and 
labelling.  
 
In Europe the 1990 legislation had formalised an understanding that GM products were 
inherently different from their conventional counterparts.   In this context, substantial 
equivalence was easily ridiculed as careless and deceptive. It appeared to play down the novelty 
of GM foods, thus serving the interests of biotechnology companies. Critics turned the concept 
itself into a problem for consumer confidence in regulation. By 1999-2000, in response to the 
public backlash against GMOs in Europe, most European food retailers were removing GM 
ingredients from their own-brand products; this exclusion discouraged commercial cultivation 
there (Levidow and Bijman, 2002). 
 
4.2 Tighter Criteria in the UK and the EU 
 
In the late 1990s many companies applied to the UK for product approval under the simplified 
procedure of the Novel Food Regulation. In response, UK experts discussed whether substantial 
equivalence would provide an adequate assessment of risks. In the context of the public 
controversy, the expert advisory body concluded that the simplified procedure was suitable only 
for fully processed foods, no longer containing intact DNA or protein (ACNFP, 1998).  
 
The advisory committee also tightened the meaning of the concept in other ways, e.g. by 
requiring tests on the stability of the novel genetic insert. According to a UK expert: 
If we must use that criterion alone, then we will tighten its definition…. a food cannot be 
regarded as substantially equivalent if it contains any intact GM DNA, so the product must be 
highly refined to ensure that all the DNA has been denatured. Moreover, we will specify what 
tests are required; the company must monitor generations of the crop over two years at six sites. 
(ACNFP member, interview, 11.05.98). 
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A similar requirement to test genetic stability had been proposed by NGO-associated scientists 
(e.g. Ho and Steinbrecher, 1997). 
 
In the UK the problem of ‘consumer-public confidence’ helped to justify more rigorous risk 
assessment criteria, by transcending expert disagreements about their strictly ‘scientific’ 
rationale. The ACNFP had included a consumer representative since the early 1990s, and this 
influenced the committee’s judgements. According to one chairman: “Eventually the scientists 
learned how to ask questions which would concern consumers” (interview, 28.05.98). Such 
concerns were seen as going beyond science: “We cannot expect the public to take a strictly 
scientific view of safety issues”, remarked a scientist on the committee (interview, 10.05.98).  
 
The more cautious advice from UK experts was soon incorporated into EU guidelines (StCF, 
1998). Thus a national move towards more stringent criteria led to new EU-wide standards.   As 
the criteria for substantial equivalence were tightened, the concept was given a more modest 
role. 
 
4.3 Expert Controversy 
 
As the public backlash against GM food intensified in the late 1990s, the UK government 
funded a major project to improve and standardise whole-food tests on animals. Based at the 
Rowett Research Institute (RRI), the project was led by Arpad Pusztai, an internationally 
renowned expert on lectins – naturally occurring toxins that protect plants from insects. The new 
project used GM potatoes containing a transgene for a lectin that was presumed to be harmless 
to mammals. However, when unexpected results were announced on a UK television 
programme in 1998, they fuelled the GM food controversy. After ingesting the GM potato, rats 
apparently suffered damage to their immune systems and organ development. Pusztai raised the 
possibility that the process of genetic modification had led to an unknown change. This 
hypothesis was explosive because it questioned the safety of products already on the EU market, 
e.g. GM soya and maize, which likewise could have unknown changes in composition. 
 
The RRI responded by ending its support for the group’s research. It terminated Pusztai’s 
employment and denied him access to his research data. The RRI was then accused of giving 
priority to industry research contracts over independent science (sources cited in Levidow, 
2002). Asserting its authority on the issue, the Royal Society convened a special committee, 
which concluded, “We found no convincing evidence of adverse effects from GM potatoes” 
(Royal Society, 1999: 1). In response, The Lancet criticized the Royal Society for a 
“breathtakingly arrogant” approach to risk research on GM safety (Editorial, 1999). It also 
published a paper based on the GM lectin study, along with various commentaries. International 
networks of scientists now took sides for or against the validity of Pusztai’s research. This 
intensified the debate over substantial equivalence. 
 
Around this time Nature published an opinion article reflecting some activist views, thus 
signalling that these must be addressed. Referring to the Pusztai controversy, the article attacked 
substantial equivalence as an inadequate basis on which to judge whether a GM food is as safe 
as its non-GM counterpart. The authors criticized the concept on three specific grounds:  it 
emphasises chemical composition at the expense of biological, toxicological and immunological 
tests; it does not define the point at which a substance is no longer substantially equivalent; and 
the concept actually impedes risk research (Millstone et al., 1999).  More broadly the critics 
attacked the concept as an example of business influence on policy: 
Substantial equivalence is a pseudo-scientific concept because it is a commercial and political 
judgement masquerading as if it were scientific. It is, moreover, inherently anti-scientific 
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because it was created primarily to provide an excuse for not requiring biochemical or 
toxicological tests (ibid: 526). 
 
In response, advocates of substantial equivalence denied that it had ever been meant as a 
‘scientific’ concept.  Rather, it was simply a conceptual tool, which “neither specifies nor limits 
the kind or amount of testing needed for new foods” (Miller, 1999). OECD staff defended it as 
appropriate 
Substantial equivalence is not a substitute for a safety assessment. It is a guiding principle which 
is a useful tool for regulatory scientists engaged in safety assessment… In this approach 
differences may be identified for further scrutiny, which can involve nutritional, toxicological 
and immunological testing (Kearns and Mayers, 1999: 640). 
 
Thus they mentioned a range of tests, as if these had always been associated with the concept.  
This defence emphasised broader uncertainties than in the OECD’s original 1993 interpretation 
of substantial equivalence. 
 
5. Recasting “Substantial Equivalence” 
 
By the late 1990s EU regulation of GMOs was in crisis. In June 1999 the EU Environment 
Council imposed an unofficial de facto moratorium on approval of any additional GM products. 
Council members argued that before the approval procedure could resume, risk assessment must 
be made more transparent, based on precaution – especially as means “to restore public and 
market confidence” (cited in FoEE, 1999: 3).  This regulatory blockage in turn led to a trade 
conflict with the US.  Agbiotech critics demanded greater public accountability for expert 
judgements.  
 
In high-level international fora, substantial equivalence was recast, while ‘science’ was opened 
up as a policy issue. In this process, a trans-Atlantic ‘consumer rights’ agenda converged with 
European expert moves towards more stringent regulatory criteria (see Table I.3). Divergent 
views were mediated by a new collective problem: how to maintain or restore consumer-public 
confidence. This section focuses on three fora involved in this governance process. 
 
5.1 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) 
 
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) was created in 1998 with co-funding from the 
EU and USA. Its creation was a response to complaints that the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
was driving forward the transatlantic trade liberalisation agenda with no counterbalancing 
voices from civil society.  The TACD was the main network linking consumer groups in the US 
and the EU, although some key individuals also worked together on GM food in other fora. 
 
TACD member organisations had a consumer rights agenda, expressed in slogans like “the right 
to know, the right to choose”. They had diverse views about the need for agbiotech and its 
potential benefits, but they more readily found agreement on issues of safety and consumer 
rights.  Eventually TACD members formulated common positions, so that they could speak with 
a single voice in discussions with government. 
 
TACD’s first policy statement on GMOs demanded a comprehensive mandatory approval 
process (TACD, 1999). A second statement, released soon after, raised doubts specifically about 
substantial equivalence: 
It is important to consider the limitations of an approach based on “substantial equivalence” and 
consider whether more robust methods for assessing the unintended consequences of genetic 
modification are available or could be developed…  TACD calls for the development of methods 
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for assessing GM foods, which unlike “substantial equivalence” can help to give a clearer idea of 
the potential unintended consequences of genetic modification. (TACD, 2000: 2, 4) 
 
Meanwhile consumer NGOs extended their criticisms of regulatory practice. In their view, 
regulators had a weak basis on which to identify any differences between a GM food and a non-
GM counterpart. On behalf of consumer groups worldwide, a consultancy report emphasized the 
inadequate baseline information on conventional food and the patchy data submitted on GM 
food: “it is hardly plausible that compositional data have been analysed in a statistically sound 
way” (SBC, 2001: 5). European consumer organisations reiterated their previous proposals that 
‘More resources need to be made available for independent, unbiased scientific research’, 
especially ‘for further nutritional, toxicological and immunological evaluation where there are 
differences in the composition of a GM crop and its non-GM reference, whether intended or 
unintended’ (BEUC, 2001: 3-4). 
 
As this quote indicates, consumer groups framed the problem as reducible uncertainties which 
could be clarified by better data and new test methods. Through the TACD, consumer NGOs 
communicated this view directly to policymakers in the US and EU administrations.  
 
5.2 EU-US Consultative Forum 
 
In May 2000 Presidents Prodi and Clinton launched the EU-US Consultative Forum on 
Biotechnology (the EU-US Forum). It was comprised of 20 expert members including 
representatives from industry, environmental and consumer groups. It had a remit to “consider 
the full range of issues of concern in biotechnology in the United States and the European 
Union, most of which relate to… food and agriculture”. Strategically, it was designed to find a 
route beyond the trans-Atlantic trade conflict. 
 
The EU-US Forum implicitly redefined substantial equivalence. According to the final report, 
GM food products should “be subject to a mandatory pre-market examination by the appropriate 
regulatory authorities” (EU-US Forum, 2000: 4, 8).  It describes substantial equivalence in a 
relatively modest way: 
The concept of substantial equivalence should only be used to structure a safety assessment. The 
fact that a biotechnology food is held to be substantially equivalent to a conventional food should 
not be taken automatically to mean that it needs less testing or less regulatory oversight than 
“non-substantially” equivalent biotechnology foods. The concept of substantial equivalence 
should be improved by the development and application of new techniques, which can help to 
identify unintended and potentially harmful changes. (ibid: 10; Recommendation 5). 
The EU-US Forum thereby suggested that more scientific tests were needed to make the concept 
robust. 
 
Both administrations accommodated the final report in their responses. The European 
Commission pointed out that it was funding numerous projects to develop new techniques for 
substantial equivalence (CEC, 2001a; cf. DG Research, 2001). The US government stated: 
Substantial equivalence is sometimes wrongly characterized as an attempt to avoid applying 
approval procedures to bioengineered food products. This is not the case. In the U.S., we use this 
concept as a starting point in our risk assessment process (U.S. Dept of State, 2000: 3). 
 
That statement implied a level of scrutiny which did not exist; the US government did not (and 
at the time of writing still does not) require producers to seek pre-market approval of GM food. 
 
Within the EU-US Consultative Forum, the problem of consumer-public confidence allowed 
consumer groups to find common ground with a wider network.   One participant reflected later 
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that “The whole point of it was to try and look at what changes are needed to gain greater 
consumer confidence in GMOs…” (interview, European consumer representative, 11.10.02). A 
report from a US NGO, directed at the US FDA, used a similar language: feeding studies “might 
detect problems and they would add public confidence to safety determinations of a new 
technology with less-than-perfect testing protocols” (CSPI, 2003: 21). 
 
5.3 Codex Alimentarius Commission 
 
The FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission sets global food standards. After the WTO 
was created in 1995, its adjudication procedures raised the political stakes associated with 
Codex standards, which could play a role in a trade dispute. In the late 1990s, when GM food 
was being blocked in the EU, some member states raised the need for Codex standards in this 
area. At its 23rd session in June-July 1999, the Codex Alimentarius Commission initiated an Ad 
Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology.  
 
Before the first meeting of the Task Force, the host representative broadly defined the problem 
that the governments faced: 
We are required to promote biotechnology based on consumer understanding about the safety of 
the technology. We have to reach an international consensus on the safety of foods derived from 
biotechnology. − Shingo Haketa, Vice-Minister for Health and Welfare, Japan (Reuters, 2000).  
 
At its first meeting the Task Force mandated a new expert consultation. Amongst other issues, 
this expert consultation had to consider questions related to substantial equivalence (CAC, 
2000). Only scientists were appointed to the expert group but some of these discussed the issues 
with consumer NGOs.  In the Codex deliberations that followed, important roles were played by 
non-state actors, e.g. Consumers International and the Bio-Industry Organisation (e.g. CI, 
2000a). They were admitted officially as ‘observers’ but in practice were more active. 
 
CI proposed that the expert group’s report should abandon the concept of ‘substantial 
equivalence’ altogether (CI, 2000b). However, this was impossible, because leading 
governments were committed to the concept in some form. The CI representative then supported 
moves to redefine it in ways that weakened the emphasis on similarity with conventional food.  
 
The expert report accommodated this proposal. For example, it attributed deep conflicts to “the 
mistaken impression that the determination of substantial equivalence was the end point of a 
safety assessment”. It argued instead that the concept should be used “to identify similarities and 
differences…” and that a compositional comparison “was not the sole basis for determining 
safety”. When comparing a GM food and a conventional counterpart: “If the differences exceed 
natural variations, a nutritional and toxicological assessment is required” (FAO/WHO, 2000: 7).   
 
Moreover, the report emphasised unknown risks: “Present approaches to assess possible 
unintended effects are based, in part, on the analysis of specific components (targeted approach). 
In order to increase the probability of detecting unintended effects, profiling techniques are 
considered as useful alternatives (non-targeted approach)” (ibid: 6).  At the same time, the report 
acknowledged that more work was required to develop such techniques, e.g. metabolomics and 
proteomics (ibid: 20). 
 
The Task Force basically accepted the expert consultation report, including the prospect of 
“unintended effects”, which may be either predictable or unexpected (CAC, 2001; also CAC, 
2002). Some disagreements arose over risk-assessment criteria. For evaluating the composition 
of GM food, the US government initially proposed that the “conventional counterpart” could 
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itself be a GM food, but this was not accepted (CAC, 2001). There were also disagreements on 
appropriate methods for evaluating evidence of allergenicity. Some European experts expressed 
views similar to consumer NGOs; they favoured a “decision tree”, whereby a single piece of 
evidence could be used to reject a product.  By contrast the US-led view favoured “the 
preponderance of evidence”, whereby all available evidence would be considered together.   
 
Despite such disagreements, the Task Force agreed guidelines, which were then adopted by 
Codex. They mention various test methods that might be deemed necessary for a risk 
assessment. For example, for compositional tests to be meaningful, the crop should be grown 
under relevant agronomic conditions in a variety of sites. Beyond conventional toxicology 
studies, “Additional in vivo or in vitro studies may be needed on a case-by-case basis to assess 
the toxicity of expressed substances” (CAC, 2003a: 30; see Table II).  
 
The final document was widely welcomed as articulating international standards, from quite 
diverse standpoints. NGOs expressed the view that the new standards could protect consumer 
rights vis à vis US pressures against more stringent regulation elsewhere.  Indeed, governments 
now had “…a protective shield for any strong risk-assessment system which may be challenged 
at the WTO” (interview, Consumers International, 30.10.02). 
 
Beyond mandating more stringent criteria, the redefinition of substantial equivalence opened up 
technical criteria to wider accountability. This implicitly shifted the boundary between science 
and policy. In a parallel development, “risk-assessment policy” was made an explicit issue for 
food safety in general (CAC, 2003b).   
 
Meanwhile some experts suggested renaming substantial equivalence as “the comparative 
approach”. Indeed, an OECD staff member retrospectively gave this name to proposals in the 
1991 FAO/WHO expert consultation report, while implying that the concept always had a 
modest meaning (Kearns, 2002: 12).  Likewise EU experts later articulated “the comparative 
approach” for risk assessment of GM food (EFSA 2004a: 12-13). The new name implied more 
scientific uncertainty and a greater burden of proof required to demonstrate similarity with a 
safe food. 
 
6. Re-interpreting “Substantial Equivalence” in EU practice 
 
As outlined in the previous section, transatlantic governance processes ran in parallel with EU 
efforts to regain control of GM food regulation, especially by separating safety from wider 
issues. Consumer groups participated in discussions about the scientific uncertainties that 
needed to be clarified through better knowledge. Through a scientification process, risk-
assessment criteria became more open-ended, dependent on further test results and debate over 
their significance. In the late 1990s doubts had been raised about the available test methods, 
along with proposals to improve them and to develop more sensitive tests (shown in Table II). 
At stake for governments was how to redraw a science/policy boundary whilst avoiding further 
politicisation. This section shows how changes in European regulatory practice had difficulties 
in stabilising a ‘science’ on which to base safety judgements (see Table I.4). 
 
[Insert Table II] 
 
6.1 Concept as Dynamic 
 
In European regulation of GM foods, a turning point came in August 2000, when the Italian 
government suspended the sale of products derived from four varieties of GM maize.  These 
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products had already gained EU-wide approval under the simplified procedure, based on a claim 
for substantial equivalence. According to the Italian government, however, the notifiers had not 
shown that the GM maize was substantially equivalent to conventional maize. They argued that 
the products should undergo a full risk assessment. 
 
The European Commission sought an expert basis on which to lift the ban. DG Consumer 
Affairs requested advice from the relevant EU-level expert body, the Scientific Committee on 
Food (SCF). The SCF advised that the Italian authorities had not provided evidence that the GM 
maize posed a risk to human health. Citing this advice, the European Commission then 
demanded that Italy remove the ban; and it requested support from the Standing Committee on 
Foodstuffs, which represents EU member states. That body instead sided with Italy, stating: “it 
was unacceptable that GMO-derived products were placed on the EU market under the 
simplified procedure, without undergoing a full safety assessment” (StCF, 2000: 2).  
 
Such conflicts led the Commission to omit a simplified procedure from its draft Regulation on 
GM Food and Feed. It stated that: 
The use of this regulatory short-cut for so-called “substantially equivalent” GM foods has been 
very controversial in the Community in recent years… and there is consensus at the international 
level… that whilst substantial equivalence is a key step in the safety assessment process of 
genetically modified foods, it is not a safety assessment in itself (CEC, 2001b; cf. EC, 2003: 1). 
Thus the Commission cited an international consensus in the reports of the EU-US Forum and 
the Codex Task Force.  
 
This change in the status of substantial equivalence extended earlier moves to open up risk-
assessment criteria as a policy issue. According to a Commission official, substantial 
equivalence would be kept as a risk-assessment tool, although EU-wide harmonisation might be 
difficult for this “dynamic concept”, whose interpretation was still under development (Pettauer, 
2002: 23). This acknowledges dependence on scientific knowledge yet to be gained. 
 
6.2 Policy Shifts in Risk Assessment 
 
Meanwhile EU scientific advisors were highlighting the lack of agreed assessment criteria and 
test methods in relation to substantial equivalence. In addition, they argued, available tests could 
find only whatever they targeted: “Currently applied methods do not provide certainty to detect 
all new non-targeted plant constituents or an increase of the amount of unintended existing toxic 
constituents and therefore the methods need to be expanded” (SSC, 2000: 8). Consumer groups 
continued to emphasise “methodological limitations for obtaining meaningful information” e.g. 
from animal tests on whole foods, and from compositional tests (Schenkelaars, 2002: 62). At 
this time EC legislation listed risk-assessment criteria but did not say what tests were needed in 
which cases (EEC, 1990; EC, 1997a, 1997b). More detailed guidance did not specify exactly 
what compositional differences would warrant what additional tests, and anyway such 
documents had no statutory force (e.g. SSC, 2000, 2002). 
 
In the absence of clear statutory guidance at the EU level, some expert advisors took the 
initiative at the national level and requested more extensive information on products being 
submitted for approval there. This procedure slowly elaborated assessment criteria and test 
requirements via case-by-case judgements, sometimes involving discussions with NGOs. For 
example, Dutch consumer groups and government advisors discussed weaknesses of data 
packages from companies (Schenkelaars, 2005).  After biotechnology companies started 
submitting requests for GM food authorisation to the Netherlands in 1999, its food safety 
experts recognised the limitations of compositional data for risk assessment.  The authorities 
asked the companies to document the content of secondary metabolites in the GM crop 
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compared to those of the non-GM control (SBC, 2001). Industry supplied this information as 
part of an overall effort to harmonise data requirements across the EU (EuropaBio, 2001; 
Amijee, 2002: 50).   
 
There are other examples of how a national advisory body shifted EU-wide criteria along more 
stringent lines. Until 1999 the UK and Germany were the two EU member states that received 
most notifications for commercial approval of GM foods. When the UK received applications to 
approve fresh food products derived from new GM maize crops, the company’s dossiers already 
included toxicology and allergenicity data, and so went beyond compositional equivalence.  But 
the advisory committee regarded this as inadequate (ACNFP, 2001: 7-8). More rigorous data 
were eventually submitted to satisfy the committee. The requirements echoed those that NGO 
scientists had proposed in the mid-1990s (CI, 1996; Ho and Steinbrecher, 1997; Tappeser & von 
Weizsacker, 1996). 
 
For generic issues of GM food safety, the UK Royal Society established a working group which 
included a consumer representative. Echoing NGO proposals, its report emphasized the need to 
define the ‘normal’ composition of conventional plants, as a basis for any comparison with GM 
plants, as well as the need to develop more sensitive tests (Royal Society, 2002: 6). The report 
reveals tensions around expert authority over regulatory science. The authors agreed “that 
scientific assessments must inform policy decisions but cannot pre-empt them, and that public 
opinion must be taken into account throughout”. Moreover, “The amount of comparative data 
required to establish substantial equivalence involves a somewhat subjective judgement” – yet 
the criteria “should be made explicit and objective” (ibid: 2002: 5-6). Such contradictory 
language indicates a tension between opening up assessment criteria and maintaining a distinct 
expert, scientific realm. 
 
Long-standing test methods were recast as near the research frontier and even as 
methodologically doubtful. Not only NGOs but also expert advisors voiced doubts about 
compositional comparisons: “Limitations of this analytical comparative approach are the 
possible occurrence of unknown toxicants and anti-nutrients…”, argued a Dutch food safety 
advisor, who also served on the EU delegation to Codex (Kuiper et al., 2001: 515). Expert 
advisors also suggested that new safety tests might be necessary to assess future novel products. 
Scientists in the Netherlands took a lead in proposing more sensitive techniques e.g. messenger 
RNA and micro-array analysis of its expression. They also emphasised profiling techniques e.g. 
proteomics for detecting changes in protein content, and metabolomics for detecting changes in 
metabolic activity (Kuiper et al., 1999). They argued that such methods should be developed 
further and validated, especially for detecting secondary effects due to more extensive genetic 
modification of future GM crops (Kuiper et al., 2001: 523). 
 
Some scientists also initiated a European network on the safety assessment of GM food (DG 
Research, 2001: 130-32; Entransfood, 2003).  Taking part in the discussions, consumer 
representatives extended their cooperative relation with research scientists and expert advisors.  
They also became more enthusiastic about efforts to develop profiling techniques.  However, 
some experts anticipated that such methods would generate voluminous data that would be 
difficult to interpret meaningfully.  Industry warned against any premature new requirements to 
use such tests (EuropaBio, 2004). 
 
Building on earlier documents (SSC, 2000, 2002), the European Food Safety Authority drafted 
new guidance for risk assessment of GM products.  EFSA’s experts outlined tests of nutritional 
content, toxicology and allergenicity. “In the case of newly expressed proteins with an 
insufficient database and, in particular, if the available data suggest the existence of any cause 
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for concern”, they requested toxicological tests – a 28-day repeated-dose test for acute effects of 
the purified novel protein, and a 90-day test of the whole food (SSC, 2003: 19; EFSA GMO 
Panel 2004: 33). This request conflicted with the industry position that a 14-day acute toxicity 
test would provide adequate information (EuropaBio, 2001, 2004). In any case, the expert 
guidance left unclear what GM products or preliminary test results would justify such tests.  
 
European consumer groups welcomed the guidance and proposed further development of test 
methods, e.g. profiling techniques.  Such groups wanted to be consulted about risk-assessment 
criteria, though they had different views on directly participating in official procedures (BEUC, 
2003). They sought accountability for the framing of scientific uncertainty but did not question 
the safety of GM foods already approved by the EU. 
 
European experts had mixed feelings about their convergence and practical relations with 
consumer groups around issues of scientific uncertainty. They valued the interaction whilst also 
lamenting the politicisation of science and accusations of bias. For example:  
 
My relations with consumer groups have been positive and negative.  There have been 
discussions about the types of tests and their usefulness; these discussions have included 
consumer groups such as the Consumentenbond. On the negative side, some anti-GM people 
question my credibility (interview, Dutch expert advisor, 2003). 
We need to clarify the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uncertainty.  Good 
scientists can recognise where experiments establish certainty or leave open uncertainty. But 
uncertainty is a ball played by stakeholders (interview, Austrian food scientist, 2003). 
 
6.3 Toxicological Tests in Dispute 
 
Official experts too have played the uncertainty ball, thus providing scope for the further 
politicisation of science and scientification of politics.  Experts disagreed about the ‘normal 
variation’ which could provide a baseline for comparing the different test animals, and thus the 
empirical basis for a judgement on substantial equivalence (Levidow et al., 2005: 269).  Earlier 
difficulties over whole-food toxicology tests became a high-profile controversy around a 
specific product.   
 
In autumn 2004 Monsanto’s MON 863 maize was moving towards EU approval for import 
only. Shortly before the EU regulatory committee was to vote on safety approval, journalists 
leaked a critical report by a French advisory committee from the previous year. It noted 
statistical anomalies, especially that GM-fed rats had lower kidney weights than the control 
animals. According to its report, the committee could not definitively conclude that risk was 
absent (CGB, 2003). 
 
Deficient company science now became a high-profile issue, especially in France and the UK. 
Speaking to journalists, the CGB President emphasised the need for “sound, validated scientific 
results” on MON 863. Launching a mass-media campaign, the French NGO Crii-Gen declared, 
“experts acknowledge that GM food has significant effects on animals” (as quoted in 
Mennessier, 2004). The relevant German Ministry, headed by a Green Party politician, asked 
Arpad Pusztai to evaluate the rat feeding tests. Citing the differences in kidney weights, his 
September 2004 report advocated further studies on the immune response of animals in order to 
gain essential information. Citing these comments in turn, European environmental NGOs 
attacked the company’s scientific evidence. 
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However, EU experts rejected these criticisms. In their view, similar variations were found 
among animals fed conventional maize and so were unrelated to feeding with GM maize. 
Consequently, “Whilst some statistically significant differences were observed, these 
differences were not considered as biologically relevant since they fell within normal variation 
ranges”. EU experts stated that extra tests would be worthwhile only “if there are indications of 
the occurrence of unintended effects” from the product, but this was not the case for MON 863 
(EFSA GMO Panel, 2004b: 4). The French CGB then reported that it had no concerns about 
risks to animal health from MON 863.  
 
Despite the greater expert consensus, controversy continued. Some national experts wanted 
clarity on the normal baseline, as a stronger basis for judgements about biological relevance. 
According to a dissident member of the CGB, it was unacceptable for the product file to treat 
each risk issue separately, and the rat study should have been redone (quoted in Foucart, 2004). 
 
A few months later similar risk issues were turned into the front-page story of a UK quality 
newspaper. The story now had extra twists: the company’s refusal to disclose raw data from the 
rat experiments; Pusztai’s role in criticising the available data; and his marginalisation by the 
establishment: 
 
Here, environment editor Geoffrey Lean, who has led this paper’s campaign on GM technology 
for the past six years, examines the new evidence. And he asks the questions that must concern 
us all: Why is Monsanto, the company trying to sell GM corn to Britain and Europe, so reluctant 
to publish the full results of its alarming tests on lab rats? Why are our leaders so keen to buy the 
unproven technology against the wishes of consumers? And why is the man who first raised 
these concerns six years ago shunned by the scientific establishment and his former political 
masters? (Lean, 2005). 
 
Such conflicts over company data persisted among member states, which increasingly criticised 
EFSA’s safety claims.  To address this conflict, in April 2006 the Commission invited EFSA to 
clarify which specific protocols should be used by applicants to carry out scientific studies 
demonstrating safety, e.g. toxicology tests (CEC, 2006). 
 
In sum, EU procedures moved towards more extensive and rigorous test methods for assessing 
GM food safety. This move opened up greater scope for expert disagreements about scientific 
evidence – indeed, for politicisation of science. The regulatory procedure had difficulties in 
establishing the cognitive authority of official EU experts and thus in stabilising ‘science-based 
regulation’.   
 
 
7. Analysis: Trans-Atlantic Governance of GM Food Safety 
 
In the introduction to this paper we set an overall task: to analyse how different policy agendas 
framed scientific uncertainty around GM food. We also asked three questions about the concept 
of substantial equivalence: What agendas initially shaped the concept? How has its meaning 
changed over time? How can these changes be explained?  After outlining the diverse framings 
of risk issues, this section answers the three questions.  Overall this section draws on the 
theoretical concepts and arguments discussed earlier in this paper. We analyse the case over 
time, focusing on key processes, as follows: scientisation begun and blocked; scientification 
with politicisation; and governance through collective problems. 
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7.1 Framings of Scientific Uncertainty 
 
In the late 1990s an intense public controversy around GMOs gave European critics more 
opportunities to challenge risk-assessment criteria for GM products. In the GM food debate, 
scientific uncertainty about risk was framed according to three main policy agendas: 
 
1) Pro-agbiotech groups: GM techniques are more precise than alternatives and they make GM 
food risks more predictable than conventional food risks. Risks are readily testable, especially 
through compositional tests, which can be standardised across countries. Such tests will indicate 
if additional knowledge is needed to detect unintended effects. 
 
2) Anti-agbiotech groups: GM techniques are inherently risky by generating unknown hazards, 
although these might sometimes be revealed through risk research. Agricultural biotechnology is 
an extension of the industrial agri-food system, which has already harmed health and the 
environment. GM products are pollutants, which should not be permitted.   
 
3) Mainstream consumer groups:  Consumers have “a right to know and a right to choose” safe 
food. GM food carries uncertain risks which must be clarified through more rigorous methods. 
Safety depends on adequate, reliable and accountable science. Such science is essential for 
improving regulatory procedures and thus gaining consumer confidence. 
 
In these frames, risk assessment was associated with regulatory efficiency, wider industrial 
hazards and consumer rights, respectively. Each framing had its own view of substantial 
equivalence as a basis for risk assessment.  Together these frames constituted the uncertainties 
to be debated and clarified. 
 
7.2 Scientisation Begun and Blocked  
 
When the concept of substantial equivalence was introduced, it provided a technocratic basis for 
scientising risk-assessment policy. The concept drew a line between science and policy, as if 
risk-assessment criteria lay on the side of science (cf. Jasanoff, 1987). The concept was then 
used to compare GM foods with their non-GM counterparts and to confirm their similarity as 
regards safety. At least initially, risk assessment emphasised tests of physico-chemical 
composition as the means to detect any unintended changes, while acute toxicity tests targeted 
the known novel protein. The concept was used to justify no or minimal regulatory scrutiny. It 
facilitated safety claims, limited demands for scientific information and avoided arguments over 
methodological difficulties. 
  
In addition, substantial equivalence was used to standardise risk-assessment criteria across 
countries. This served the general OECD remit for efficient, harmonised regulatory regimes and 
thus trade liberalisation (cf. Newell, 2003). The US and the EU both adopted the concept in the 
1990s. At the same time, it could be flexibly interpreted to accommodate different national 
contexts and new issues, thus making an inter-governmental consensus possible. Thus the pro-
agbiotech frame informed early risk-assessment procedures, which facilitated trans-Atlantic 
commercialisation and trade liberalisation of GM products. 
 
When European controversy over GM food erupted from 1997 onwards, however, substantial 
equivalence was vulnerable to attack by long-standing and new policy actors. This vulnerability 
had its origins in the policy agendas that had shaped the concept. Critics raised various doubts, 
which expressed of socio-political conflict over a contentious innovation. They drew analogies 
between biotechnological models of intensive agriculture and other health risks, especially mad 
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cow disease. They criticised substantial equivalence for playing down the novelty of GM food, 
for helping companies to bypass a risk assessment, and for minimising evidence of safety.  
 
In the late 1990s protestors were opposing the use of scientific rationality to conceal political 
choices as technical ones, by analogy to previous technoscientific-risk controversies (cf. Nelkin, 
1979). Safety approval was cast as an undemocratic submission to the US government and 
multinational companies; European activists turned GM food into an ominous symbol of 
‘globalisation’ (cf. Lipschutz, 1997; Paterson et al., 2003). These developments undermined the 
public legitimacy of risk-assessment procedures, especially in Europe.  The intense controversy 
blocked efforts to scientise policy through the concept of substantial equivalence. 
 
7.3 Scientification with Politicisation 
 
The GM food controversy stimulated greater scrutiny of available test methods, thus challenging 
the initial meaning of substantial equivalence. Available tests were recast as being at or near the 
research frontier (cf. Weingart, 1999). The 1991 FAO/WHO expert consultation had warned 
governments about the weaknesses of compositional tests and any comparisons based on them, 
but the 1993 OECD report had ignored this warning. In the late 1990s compositional tests were 
then subjected to greater criticism, particularly on the grounds that they led to deceptive 
comparisons. Consumer groups sponsored their own expert reports, which challenged 
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the test data submitted by companies. 
 
Under these circumstances European governments became more dependent upon scientific 
progress to justify their risk-assessment procedures. Long-standing tests became newly 
contentious (e.g. physico-chemical composition) and newly relevant (e.g. whole-food 
toxicology), even for GM foods similar to those already approved.  This scientification process 
generated an abundance of knowledge which was open to diverse expert interpretations. This in 
turn created more opportunities to politicise science. Policy actors became engaged in an 
adversarial, inflationary competition – for expert claims, for the latest research results, for new 
test methods, and for any weaknesses in inconvenient results – on both sides of the controversy. 
This contest undermined the cognitive authority of science for regulatory purposes. 
 
These dynamics are illustrated by methodological difficulties in testing whole foods on animals, 
as a non-targeted means to detect unintended effects.  As discussed above, the UK government 
funded Pusztai’s research to improve such test methods, yet the experiments led to unexpected 
results, which were cited to raise doubts about GM food safety in 1998-99. This in turn 
polarised international expert networks,  creating opportunities for NGOs and others to contest 
safety claims. Again in 2004 the results of whole-food toxicology tests became contentious for 
Monsanto’s MON 863 maize, as experts disagreed about the ‘normal variation’ as a meaningful 
comparator for GM-fed animals. 
 
Through the processes of scientification and politicisation, therefore, public-scientific 
controversy broke the earlier link between science and policy.  Various expert disputes 
undermined any separate realm of ‘science’, which had been central to the pro-biotech framing 
and early concepts of substantial equivalence. Contending policy agendas had effectively 
politicised regulatory science and thus weakened it as a basis for risk assessment. This contest 
left an unstable basis for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable knowledge for the safety 
assessment of GM foods.  By contrast to the agro-environmental issues of cultivating GM crops, 
GM food safety had a relatively greater potential for scientific progress which could facilitate an 
expert consensus, but its realisation and legitimacy depended upon expert-stakeholder relations. 
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7.4 Governance through New Collective Problems 
 
In the context of the European legitimacy crisis and trans-Atlantic trade conflict, various 
international fora were created or extended, e.g. the EU-US Forum, FAO/WHO expert 
consultation and the Codex Task Force. These fora began to accommodate the framing of 
mainstream consumer groups, which suggested that a more precautionary, rigorous and 
accountable form of risk assessment was necessary to gain consumer-public confidence. That 
new problem-definition created a broader common ground for more stringent criteria, while 
potentially transcending disagreements about their prior ‘scientific’ rationale in biotechnological 
risks.   
 
In this way the arguments being made by consumer groups, which emphasised reducible 
uncertainties, converged with European expert proposals for more rigorous test methods. Based 
mainly in Europe, this convergence provided a basis to govern the societal conflict at national, 
EU and trans-Atlantic scales. Stakeholder relations were governed by constructing a new 
collective action problem – restoring consumer-public confidence – which did not obviously 
exist beforehand (cf. Young, 1997). 
 
International processes and fora like the EU-US Forum extended informal alliances which were 
already arising within some European countries. The new Codex standards in particular 
exemplify governance as the result of “alliances between coalitions in global civil society and 
the international governance arrangements associated with the UN system” (cf. Lipschutz, 1997: 
96). In these processes, leading roles were played by key individuals from the US and EU, just 
as policy actors from these jurisdictions had played leading roles in the earlier agenda of trade 
liberalisation. Thus this process can be seen as trans-Atlantic governance of GM food. 
 
The new collective problem of restoring consumer-public confidence marginalised the anti-
agbiotech frame, e.g. the problem of “GM pollution” imposing unknowable risks. Even when 
environmental protest groups participated in relevant events and consultations, risks were 
framed as reducible uncertainties. Through this process, more difficult political issues could be 
mediated or displaced by risk-assessment criteria, which remain open-ended. A focus on food 
safety separated biophysical risk issues from deeper conflicts over ‘GM food’ – a phrase 
symbolising an ominous form of globalisation, trade liberalisation and the further 
industrialisation of agriculture. In this way consumer groups participated in governing the 
conflict around a product that they did not welcome. Thus a governance process can render 
politics obsolete, leaving only managerial and procedural issues (cf. Pestre, 2006).   
 
8 Conclusion: Science/Policy Boundary Shifts 
 
In sum, substantial equivalence has been recast in at least three ways: (1) it has been implicitly 
redefined, through extra phrases in official documents, to focus on looking for differences 
between a GM food and its non-GM counterpart; (2) it has been re-interpreted, as risk-
assessment procedures have addressed more scientific uncertainties and have required more 
evidence of safety than before, especially in Europe; and (3) it has been demoted in EU 
regulatory procedures so that it can no longer be used to justify the claim that a risk assessment 
is unnecessary. By 2003 official experts were further softening the concept by calling it “a 
comparative approach”,  as if it always had this more modest meaning. 
 
In recasting substantial equivalence, the original boundary between science and policy was 
redrawn (cf. Jasanoff, 1987).  A broadly defined ‘science’ informed early risk-assessment 
procedures, but later those ‘scientific’ criteria were recast as policy-laden or at least as mixed 
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issues. This shift involved and implied legitimate scope for the involvement of non-specialists, 
e.g. through consultation with NGOs and wider publics. At least in Europe, governments 
became less able to invoke a separate realm of ‘science’ to justify safety claims. Some 
regulatory authorities imposed more data requirements, although for various reasons, e.g. to 
demonstrate greater scientific rigour or to justify regulatory delays. 
 
In European procedures more recently there has been a tension between two aims: re-
establishing an ‘objective’ scientific basis for decisions, versus leaving risk-assessment criteria 
open for further policy debate with stakeholders. Expert advisors in particular faced the 
challenge of expanding their cognitive authority over a broader range of ‘science’ than before. 
They requested more rigorous data from a wider range of tests than before (see again Table II). 
Such pressures circulated among member states, often leading to further conflict over the data 
necessary for risk assessment and difficulties in stabilising such requirements. 
 
Any science/policy boundary becomes less stable in the shift towards non-targeted approaches, 
which lie at research frontiers in looking for unknown changes. Consumer groups and expert 
advisors in Europe have welcomed this prospect, but industry has warned against any premature 
requirements, which could generate yet more ambiguous data.  Indeed, further scientification 
could readily bring more politicisation of science. 
 
This paper has extended interdisciplinary approaches to the study of technoscientific-risk 
controversies, especially by linking analytical perspectives on regulatory science and 
governance.  Through the interaction of three contending risk frames, the consumer “right to 
safe food” converged with the problem of consumer-public confidence and expert moves 
towards more precautionary, rigorous risk assessment. A governance process played many roles 
including: facilitating interactions between stakeholders; accommodating some critics rather 
than others; managing conflicts over safety claims; and displacing fundamental conflicts over 
technological choices. In these ways a governance process can help legitimise an expert basis 
for regulatory decisions, but this basis remains vulnerable to further politicisation. 
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Table I  Key Events in the Changed Meaning of Substantial Equivalence 
 
 
I.1 Implementing the concept (early to mid 1990s) 
 
1990:  EC Directive 90/220 on deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. 
1992:  US FDA guidelines emphasise analytical tests of chemical composition, as a basis to establish the 
‘substantial similarity’ of a novel food with a familiar one Generally Recognised as Safe (GRAS).  
1993:  OECD guidelines present ‘substantial equivalence’ as the international consensus on how to assess the safety 
of GM food.  They ignore expert warnings about absent information for comparisons with a conventional 
counterpart. 
1996:  FAO/WHO expert consultation endorses OECD approach. 
1997:  EU Novel Food Regulation 258/97 includes a simplified procedure which allows companies to avoid a risk 
assessment if they can show that a GM food is ‘substantially equivalent’ to an existing safe food. 
1998:  Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership is created. Its Action Plan proposes a pilot project on ‘simultaneous 
scientific assessments’ of a GM product in the US and the EU, thus following an agenda from the Trans-Atlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD). 
 
I.2 Challenging the concept (mid to late 1990s) 
1996:  Consumers International publish a report critical of ‘substantial equivalence’. 
1996/97:  Europe receives first shipments of US maize and soya containing GM grain, leading to public protests. 
1997:  For implementing EU Regulation 258/97, UK Advisory Committee on Novel Foods (ACNFP) accepts 
‘substantial equivalence’ for the simplified procedure only in cases where no intact GM DNA or protein remains 
after processing. 
1998:  EU regulatory committee adopts UK’s more stringent criteria for the simplified procedure. 
1998:  Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) is created as a counter-weight to the TABD. 
1998:  Arpad Pusztai announces unexpected alarming results of his GM lectin experiments on a UK television 
programme.  The Royal Society attempts to undermine his claims, even before publication, and The Lancet 
criticises the Royal Society. 
1999:  EU Environment Council members begin an unofficial de facto moratorium on authorising additional GM 
products.  They demand that the authorisation procedure be made transparent, based on precaution. 
1999:  Millstone et al. criticise substantial equivalence as ‘unscientific’ in an article in Nature.  Others defend the 
concept as a risk-assessment tool. 
1999:  Arpad Pusztai publishes experimental results which are cited to undermine safety claims for GM food., 
leading to polarisation between international expert networks  
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I.3 Recasting the concept (late 1990s to early 2000s) 
 
1999:  Codex Alimentarius sets up an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from 
Biotechnology. 
2000:  TACD criticises substantial equivalence and calls for ‘more robust methods’ to test safety. 
2000:  EU-US Consultative Forum on Biotechnology issues its report, which accepts the concept of ‘substantial 
equivalence’ but highlights the need for better methods to identify unintended and potentially harmful changes in 
GM food. 
2000:  FAO/WHO expert consultation emphasises that substantial equivalence should guide efforts to look for 
differences and similarities between a GM food and its non-GM counterpart.  
2003:  Codex adopts standards based on the FAO/WHO expert report, thus implicitly redefining substantial 
equivalence. 
2004:  EU experts emphasise ‘a comparative approach’ as the meaning of substantial equivalence. 
 
I.4 Changing regulatory practice in the EU (early 2000s) 
 
2000:  Italy invokes safeguard clause of Regulation 258/97 to suspend the authorisation of GM products, on 
grounds that substantial equivalence was not demonstrated under the simplified procedure. European Commission 
asks Italy to lift the ban and requests support from other member states, who instead criticise the simplified 
procedure in the Regulation. 
2001:  European Commission proposes a new Regulation on GM Food and Feed, which does not include a 
simplified procedure based on substantial equivalence, partly on grounds that it has “been very controversial in the 
Community in recent years”. 
2002:  EU’s Scientific Steering Committee circulates draft guidancee for GM products, specifying tests for food 
safety. 
2003:  As new product files circulate among EU member states, some criticise weaknesses in available data. on GM 
food safety.  Results of whole-food toxicological tests generate disagreements among member states, leading to 
mass-media coverage in 2000-05. 
2004: EU experts consult stakeholders before finalising new guidance for GM products. 
2006:  The European Commission invites EFSA to clarify which specific protocols should be used by applicants to 
carry out safety tests, e.g. for toxicology.  
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Table II Safety Tests for Novel Foods: Methodological Uncertainties and Changes 
 
Since the late 1990s doubts have been raised about the test methods available for testing the safety of 
novel foods, especially those derived from GM crops. There were proposals to improve the tests and to 
develop more sensitive or rigorous ones.  Expert advisory bodies proposed changes which gave more 
complex meanings to the concept of substantial equivalence.  Non-target approaches were developed to 
detect unintended changes and unknown risks.  Documents cited below indicate how such changes 
responded to doubts and criticism of available test methods.  
 
Risk issue and test Doubts raised Proposed changes 
 
Physico-chemical 
composition: 
establishing a 
‘normal’ baseline 
of conventional 
products, for 
evaluating 
equivalence of a 
GM food 
Incomplete data available on non-GM 
counterparts  
(CI, 1996; Schenkelaars, 2002) 
Normal baseline has great variation, 
linked to field conditions during 
cultivation.  (Haslberger, 2002; 
Schenkelaars, 2002) 
Doubts about how to specify acceptable 
degrees of compositional differences  
(Kuiper et al., 1999) 
Collect more systematic data  on 
conventional products, to gain a reliable 
baseline of natural variation (EFSA, 2004a). 
Evaluate any compositional differences vis à 
vis the range of natural variations (CAC 
2003a) 
Use standard and/or varied conditions for 
cultivating the crop, to test a range of 
contexts  (SSC, 2002; CAC 2003a). 
Provide data on secondary metabolites 
(CAC, 2003a; EFSA, 2004a). 
Develop new profiling techniques such 
proteomics and chemical fingerprinting  
(Noteborn et al., 2000; EFSA, 2004a)   
Toxicity: testing a 
novel protein by 
acute toxicity tests 
on lab animals 
Difficult to obtain a large amount of 
plant-derived pure protein; easier to use a 
microbe-derived substitute, which may 
be different. 
Test can detect only known novel 
proteins, not unintended or pleiotropic 
effects (SSC, 2000). 
Must demonstrate equivalence of any 
microbial substitute.  
Use 28-day repeated-dose test   (SSC, 2002) 
[contrasts with industry proposal for 14-day 
test as an adequate method] 
Non-targeted approaches could detect 
unintended effects (FAO/WHO 2000). 
Toxicity and/or 
nutritional quality: 
testing whole foods 
on lab animals 
Difficult to feed/consume large 
quantities of a whole food, which itself 
can yield anomalous results. 
Difficult to maintain equivalent 
nutritional content across GM and 
controls (US FDA, 1992). 
If warranted, use a 90-day test avoiding any 
nutritional imbalance (FAO/WHO, 2000; 
SSC, 2002; EFSA, 2004a). 
Develop new profiling techniques such as 
metabolomics (Noteborn et al., 2000; EFSA, 
2004a) 
Allergenicity: 
searching for 
similarity to a 
known allergen 
Small difference in sequence homology 
or structural similarity can make a large 
difference in allergenicity   
(Donabauer & Valenta, 2002; Spök et al., 
2005). 
Search method for allergens must be 
scientifically justified, to avoid false 
positives or negatives  (SSC, 2002; CAC 
2003a). 
Use relevant validated immunochemical 
tests (CAC 2003a; EFSA, 2004a) 
Allergenicity: 
digestibility-
degradation tests of 
protein stability 
Test results can give false negatives (CI, 
1996). 
Results are contingent on the 
experimental design, e.g. timespan and 
concentration of pepsin exposure (CSPI, 
2003) 
Degradation test must be well-validated 
(SSC, 2002; CAC 2003a). 
 
 
